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We develop a theoretical model of a mutual fund manager’s investment decision that 
incorporates three well-documented empirical regularities: (i) better past fund performance 
raises subsequent net fund inflows; (ii) fund manager compensation rises with total assets 
under management; (iii) trading has short-run price impacts. These features provide fund 
managers incentives to distort investment toward stocks in which the fund holds larger 
positions. We show that this leads to the empirically observed short-run persistence and long-
run reversal in fund performance. It also explains why mutual funds tend to be relatively 
undiversified and appear to exhibit clairvoyant stock selection. Finally, we document 
systematic patterns in aggregate market returns consistent with the hypothesis that the 
presence of fund managers has grown large enough to alter end-of-quarter returns. 
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1. Short-run persistence in performance: There is extensive evidence of short-term persistence in
performance of mutual funds (hot and cold hands).1 Zheng (1999) ﬁnds that funds with relatively
high returns in one quarter have statistically signiﬁcantly greater returns than the average mutual fund
in the next quarter; and relatively worse performers in one quarter generate lower returns than the
average mutual fund the next period.
2. Long-run reversals in performance: Zheng (1999) documents that the persistence in performance
is short-lived. In fact, more than one quarter into the future, funds that did better in the past under-
perform relative to the average fund while historically poor-performing mutual funds do better. In-
deed, this reversal in performance is so strong that cumulative returns of historically-better performers
fall below those of worse performers within 30 months. Figure 1, taken from Zheng (1999), illustrates
both the short-run persistence and long-run reversal in performance.
3. Performance ﬂow relationship: Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Rosten (1995) ﬁnd investors re-
ward better performing mutual funds with greater cash inﬂows.2 That is, private investors target their
mutual fund investments according to recent past performance.
4. Smaller or newer mutual funds and growth: Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also ﬁnd that relatively
young funds must perform better to attract investment. Zheng (1999) documents that smaller mutual
funds and growth funds particularly exhibit greater short-run persistence in performance and more
dramatic long-run reversals in performance.
5. Undiversiﬁed portfolios: Mutual funds, especially smaller, niche mutual funds, hold very undiversi-
ﬁed portfolios, which is reﬂected by their high return volatility.
6. Clairvoyant stock selection: Stocks purchased by mutual funds tend to outperform stocks that they
sell (Wermers, Chen and Jegadeesh (2000)), but, on average, actively-managed mutual funds under-
perform index funds.
7. Excess end-of-quarter returns and end-of-quarter trading: Carhart et al. (2002) ﬁnd that 80% of
funds beat the S&P on the last trading day of the year (62% for other quarter-end dates), but only
37% (40% other quarters) do so on the ﬁrst trading day of a new year. The difference is greater for
small-cap funds (91% on year end, 70% other quarter end dates versus 34% for ﬁrst quarter trading
1See Malkiel (1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Hendricks et al. (1993), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Bollen and Busse
(2002), and Zheng (1999).
2See also Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1993), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Goetzmann and Peles (1997).
1day), and large in magnitude. The difference between year end and ﬁrst day return is large, exceeding
200 basis points for small cap funds.
8. End-of-year performance is more pronounced for better historical performers: Carhart et al.
2002 ﬁnd that better past performing funds earned 42 basis points higher returns on the last trading
day, and 29 basis points lower on the ﬁrst trading day than funds with worse historical performance,
and they trade more aggressively at year’s end.
Manyoftheseempiricalregularitiesappearmutuallyinconsistent—mutualfundsappeartodoagoodjob
selecting stocks (Wermers, Chen and Jegadeesh (2000)), but under-perform index funds; better-performing
stocks tend to replicate their performance from one period to the next, but do signiﬁcantly worse for longer
horizons; etc. The contribution of this paper is to provide a coherent explanation for all of these empirical
regularities.
Onekeycomponentofourmodelistheperformance-ﬂowrelationdocumentedby, amongothers, Cheva-
lier and Ellison (1997). That is, better-performing funds in one period generally draw more investment
dollars. Because better short-run performance leads to greater investment in the fund, managers who are
compensated according to funds under management have an incentive to invest so as to increase short-run
returns, even if such investment strategies eventually lead to worse long-run performance. These short-run
incentives are enhanced when fund manager turnover is high.
The other key component of our model is the existence of short-run price impact from share purchases or
sales. Buying a signiﬁcant stake in a ﬁrm drives price up; selling drives price down. Chan and Lakonishok
(1995), andKeimandMadhavan(1997)bothdocumentthatinstitutionaltradeshaveshort-runpriceimpacts.
Standard explanations for this empirical regularity feature asymmetrically-informed traders (Kyle (1985),
Glosten (1985), Bernhardt and Hughson (2002)) or dealer inventory balance concerns. Here we care not so
much about the rationale for the short-run price impact of taking large trading positions, but rather that the
price impact exists and does not vanish immediately.
Fund managers who care about short-term performance have an incentive to distort their investment of
new funds toward stocks in which they hold positions. The short-run price impact from these additional
purchases raises the return on their existing positions, raising short-run total portfolio returns. Consistent
with this, Wermers, Chen and Jegadeesh (2000) ﬁnd that stocks purchased by funds have signiﬁcantly higher
returns than stocks that they sell. The short-run incentives to distort investment ensures that mutual funds
will, in the long-run, tend to under-perform non-managed indexes, unless fund managers have sufﬁciently
better information than other investors.
We then explore the consequences for short- and long-run portfolio returns. We show that short-run
2portfolio returns are initially an increasing function of new cash available to invest. As a result, as long
as cash inﬂows to better past performers are not “too” great, (1) better recent past performers earn greater
short-run returns, but (2) lower longer-run portfolio returns, because they distort investments toward assets
in place by more. That is, short-run persistence in mutual fund performance arises because better past short-
run returns raise fund ﬂow, which, in turn, raises current period returns. Higher current returns will again
lead to greater cash inﬂows and perhaps to another period of greater returns, but eventually this distortion in
investments must catch up and cause a long-run reversal in fund performance.
The analysis can also be posed from the perspective of poorer-performing funds who have cash outﬂows
and must decide which positions to liquidate. The negative impact of their sales on the returns on assets in
place ensures that their short-run poor performance persists. Indeed, poorer short-run performance may be
more persistent than short-run better performance if some of the best performers receive so much new cash
that their short-run returns are reduced (see Malkiel (1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and others).
The incentive to distort investment toward stocks in which the fund has a position is especially great if
the persistence in the price impact is high. Thus, investment distortions should be higher for smaller niche
funds in which orders tend to have more substantial and long-lasting price impacts. Similarly, investment
distortion incentives are greater for newer funds, which both tend to be smaller and have more sensitive
ﬂow-fund performance relationships (Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). Consequently, such funds should ex-
hibit more marked short-run persistence and long-run reversals in performance, as Zheng (1999) documents.
Since the price impact of trades decays over time, our theory suggests that fund managers have especially
strong incentives to augment existing holdings of a stock at the end of an evaluation period. An extreme
manifestation of this investment distortion is the practice of “high closing”—submitting a buy order that
blows through the sell limit order book at the close of a trading day at the end of an evaluation period.3
“Nearly everyone seems to agree that high closing is common. ‘It’s caused by the competitive nature of the
business. They have to beat the guy across the street.’ ”4 When the Globe and Mail newspaper (July 7,
2000) examined closing prices for the ﬁnal trading days, it found “a great many suspicious rises at points
that determine how a fund manager’s performance will be judged. The percentage of [mutual funds] that
became stars on the ﬁnal trading day and turned into dogs after New Year’s was far greater than for (ran-
domly selected mid month days)... Last-minute leaps beyond the normal market trends strongly suggested
‘portfolio pumping’.” Thomas Hirschman of the Financial Post (June 23, 2000) found that “the stocks that
are manipulated are usually illiquid stocks”. He also documented the related practice of cross-trading be-
3Another example of closing stock price manipulation is provided by Ni et al. (2003). They show that the closing prices of
stocks with listed options cluster at option strike prices on option expiration dates and that this clustering is consistent with stock
price manipulation by investors who hold short option positions.
4John Gilfoyle, Macleans magazine, July 10, 2000 p39.
3tween a mutual fund and a pension fund run by the same fund manager. The manager uses the pension fund,
which is insensitive to short-run cash inﬂow performance relations, to purchase the mutual fund’s stake in
an illiquid company.
Carhart et al. (2002) provide extensive empirical support for our model. As we have noted, funds earn
apparently tremendous short-run returns at the very end-of-quarter/end-of-year when trading behavior has
the greatest impact on quarterly or annual performance, and is especially high for small-cap funds where
trading has the greatest impact on price. Funds earn these short-run returns by dramatically increasing trade
in the last half hour, with volume increases in the last 30 minutes of 17% at year end, 14% at quarter end.
The result is that small caps earn 100 basis point returns in the last half hour of the year, 26 basis points at
other quarter ends following volume increases of 17% at year end, 14% at quarter end. Carhart et al. (2002)
reject benchmark-beating hypotheses in favor of the strategic behavior motivated here. They also ﬁnd that
this strategic effect is higher for better past performing funds, who have more cash on hand to inﬂuence
closing returns. Firms that performed better in the past year earned 42 basis points higher returns on the last
trading day and 29 basis points lower on the ﬁrst trading day than did worse-performing funds.
We then uncover evidence that because Carhart et al. (2002) measure fund performance relative to the
S&P, they almost certainly underestimate the impact of strategic mutual fund trade. We document that
strategic trade by fund managers has grown large enough to impact returns on aggregate market indexes, so
that measuring the impact relative to the index understates the total effect. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that daily
returns of the equally-weighted index on the last trading day of a quarter greatly exceed the daily returns
on the ﬁrst trading day of the succeeding quarter, and this return difference has risen with the share of total
equity held by mutual funds. Indeed, the regression of the return difference on the mutual fund share of
equity has a remarkably high adjusted R2 of 0.20. Further, no signiﬁcant relationship exists for the value-
weighted index. This reﬂects that the equally-weighted index emphasizes smaller stocks, where the price
impact of trades is more dramatic and longer-lasting, and where the incentives to distort investments are
stronger. In sum, the data strongly support the hypothesis that mutual fund managers respond to the short-
run investment incentives that we model, and that collectively they have grown large enough to signiﬁcantly
affect market outcomes.
The interpretation offered by Zheng (1999) for the short-run persistence in performance and the positive
ﬂow-performance relation is that investors are intelligent, and successfully predict future mutual fund per-
formance. The long-run under-performance implies that intelligent investors must also churn their mutual
fund portfolios on a quarterly basis, but this level of turnover is not observed in the data. In contrast, our
model takes the fund ﬂow relation as given and shows that this will induce optimizing fund managers to
behave in such a way as to generate the persistence in fund performance. In turn, if investors devote discre-
4tionary funds to past good performers, but do not churn, then in the long-run their portfolio under-performs:
retail mutual fund investors are “stupid”.
Berk and Green (2002) develop a model in which rational investors learn from a fund’s performance
about its manager’s ability, and allocate funds accordingly. Their model can explain both why money ﬂows
into mutual funds with recent better performance, and away from those with worse past performance, with
the result that past returns do not predict future performance. Berk and Green’s model is therefore incon-
sistent with the long-run reversal in performance documented by Zheng (1999). Their model also cannot
explain why stocks purchased by mutual funds outperform those that they sell, yet, on average, mutual funds
under perform the market; and is silent with regard to the end-of-quarter returns and strategic behavior doc-
umented by Carhart et al. (2002).
The next section sets up the economic environment, characterizes how the fund managers’ existing stock
holdings inﬂuence inﬂuence his investment decisions, and derives the consequences for persistence in fund
returns. Section 2 presents supporting empirical evidence. Section 3 concludes. Proofs are in an appendix.
1 Model
Consider a risk neutral mutual fund manager who can invest in three assets: stock A, stock B and cash. The
fund manager enters date t with an existing position of SAt shares in stock A and SBt shares in stock B.
The share prices at the beginning of period t are PAt and PBt, respectively. Without loss of generality we
assume that PAtSAt ≥ PBtSBt. Cash earns a risk-free return of i>0.
Firms retain their earnings. Hence, a ﬁrm’s stock price is equal to its expected discounted lifetime cash
ﬂows. We impose no structure on the timing of cash ﬂows. At the beginning of period t, each ﬁrm makes an
earnings announcement and provides guidance about future cash ﬂows, which causes market participants to
update about ﬁrm values. We summarize the earnings announcement and guidance by its implications for
the percentage change in ﬁrm value, δj,t, so that δj,tPj,t−1 is the change in expected discounted cash ﬂows.5
Following a “signal” of δj,t, investors update about cash ﬂows, leading to a date t stock price for ﬁrm j of
Pj,t =( 1+i)Pj,t−1 + δj,tPj,t−1. (1)
We assume that in period t, the mutual fund manager privately learns next period’s signals, δA,t+1 and
δB,t+1, and can trade based on this private information in period t before the signals are publicly revealed
with certainty at the beginning of period t +1 . At the end of period t, the fund receives net cash inﬂows of
5If δj,t+1 is not proportional to ﬁrm value, then pricing is sensitive to the ﬁrm’s choice of shares outstanding.
5f (rt), where rt was the return on the mutual fund’s portfolio over period t. We capture the performance-










if and only if r1
t >r 2
t—greater past fund performance raises net cash
inﬂows from investors.
For simplicity, we suppose that at date t, the fund manager invests to maximize funds under investment
at the beginning of period t +1 . In general, fund manager compensation is an increasing function of funds
under investment, and this induces the fund manager to choose his portfolio to maximize end-of-period
return. We interpret the period’s end as the date at which investors receive information about mutual fund
performance, which leads them to re-allocate their investments. Focusing on a one-period horizon for the
fund manager eases the analysis. However, the incentive effects that we document remain present when
fund manager horizons are longer.
We assume that a fund manager’s stock purchases have a short-term price impact: the more shares that
a fund manager purchases, the greater is the short-term price impact. Speciﬁcally, if the fund manager
purchases Ijt shares in stock j, he pays
ˆ Pjt(Ijt)=Pjt +∆ Pjt(Pjt,I jt), (2)
per share. We make the following assumptions on the short-term price impact of share trades:
A1. If Ijt =0 , there is no price impact:
∆Pjt(Pjt,0) = 0.




A3. The price schedules are identical for the two stocks:
∆PAt(·)=∆ PBt(·).
Assumption A3 allows us to abstract away from how different price schedules affect a fund manager’s
investment decisions. Later, we consider the possibility that price schedules differ across stocks. This
may be because some stocks are more liquid, or because market makers know the institutional holdings,
recognize fund manager investment incentives, and adjust price schedules accordingly.












In each period t, the timing of events is as follows:
61. The ﬁrm announces period earnings and market participants revise their expectations about the dis-
counted present value of the ﬁrm’s lifetime cash ﬂows. The current stock prices are given by PA,t
and PB,t.
2. The fund manager learns δA,t+1 and δB,t+1 and invests available cash in assets A,B and money,
{IAt,I Bt,M t}, so as to maximize the fund’s expected period return. Available cash is composed of
net cash inﬂows f(rt−1) plus the present value of last period’s cash position (1 + i)Mt−1. The fund
manager can sell shares, but cannot sell shares short nor borrow to ﬁnance stock investments.
3. End-of-quarter stock prices denoted QPjt are realized. Not all information about next period’s signal,
δj,t+1, necessarily leaks out by the end of the trading period.
• With (independent) probability γ the private information about stock j is revealed, in which case
QPjt =( 1+i)Pjt + δj,t+1Pjt.
• With (independent) probability (1 − γ) the private information about stock j is not revealed, in
which case
QPjt =( 1+i)Pjt +∆ Pjt(Pjt,I jt).
Thus, γ captures information release between the time of purchase and the end of the period. We
assume that γ ∈ (0,1), i.e., information is only sometimes revealed to the public. A smaller value of
γ reﬂects less leakage of information between the purchase and the end of the period. This may occur
because there is less time between the purchase of the stock and the end of the quarter or because the
stock is smaller and hence followed by fewer analysts.
4. End-of-period fund returns (rt) are calculated. The fund receives net cash inﬂows of f(rt).
Discussion. The model takes some empirical relationships such as the performance-ﬂow relationship as
given. Presumably, underlying the performance-ﬂow relationship are investor beliefs that fund managers
differ in their abilities to identify good investments and there is persistence in manager ‘ability,’ at least
in the short run (Berk and Green (2002)). In this paper, we do not want to distinguish fund managers by
ability, because differences in ability would also generate persistence in performance. We abstract from
the primitives not only because it simpliﬁes the presentation, but (i) we need only a few implications of
the primitives for our ﬁndings (e.g. monotonicity in the fund-ﬂow relationship), and do not want to impose
unneeded structure on the empirical relationships; and (ii) our reduced form assumptions are consistent
with many possible primitive formulations and we do not want to take a stand on which one is “correct”.
The pricing relationship is also a reduced-form relationship, one documented empirically by Chan and
7Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997). It may be that this pricing relationship reﬂects the fact
that trading volume contains information, or market makers must be compensated for having to re-adjust
their portfolios, and it takes time to do so. The precise details underlying the reduced-form relationship are
again unimportant for our qualitative conclusions. What is important is that the short-run return on the stock
is affected by trading activity. This gives fund managers an incentive to purchase stocks in which they hold
positions.
Fund Manager’s Problem: At the beginning of period t, the fund manager invests so as to maximize




(1 + i)Mt +

j(Ijt + Sjt)E[QPjt]





Mt ≥ 0, (3)
Ijt ≥− Sjt,j = A,B (4)

j
ˆ PjtIjt + Mt ≤ f(rt−1)+( 1+i)Mt−1. (5)
where Sj,t+1 = Sjt + Ijt and
E[QPjt] = (1 + i)Pjt +( 1− γ)∆Pjt(Pjt,I jt)+γδj,t+1Pjt
Throughout, we will assume that the short-selling constraint, Ijt ≥− Sjt,j= A,B does not bind: the fund
manager does not receive such a bad signal about a stock that he wants to sell more shares of the stock than
he has in his portfolio. The fund manager is fully invested (i.e., investments are constrained by the inﬂow of
new cash), as long as fund inﬂows are not too large relative to the manager’s private information. We will
show that no information, i.e., δA,t+1 = δB,t+1 =0 , is typically “enough” private information.
The corresponding Lagrangian6 is
L(Mt,I At,I Bt) = (1 + i)Mt +

j
(Ijt + Sjt)E [QPjt]+λMMt + λA [SAt + IAt]
+λB [SBt + IBt]+λbud

f(rt−1)+( 1+i)Mt−1 − ˆ PAtIAt − ˆ PBtIBt − Mt

.
Given that λM = λA = λB =0 , the associated ﬁrst order condition characterizing the optimal investment
in stock j ∈{ A,B} is:
∂L
∂Ijt






6Note: maximizing portfolio returns is equivalent to maximizing the portfolio end-of-period value.
8−λbud






We ﬁrst impose sufﬁcient structure on the price impact of orders such that following comparable signal
patterns, the fund manager purchases more of the stock in which his holdings are greatest:
Proposition 1 Suppose that ∆P(Pjt,I jt)=k(PjtIjt)Pjt, where k>0. Then if the value of the fund’s
initial holdings of stock A exceed the value of the fund’s holdings of stock B, i.e., PAtSAt >P BtSBt,
the fund manager tends to distort subsequent investments toward stock A. Speciﬁcally, ˆ PAtIAt(δA,t+1 =
δ1,δ B,t+1 = δ2) > ˆ PBtIBt(δA,t+1 = δ2,δ B,t+1 = δ1): the manager spends more on purchasing new shares
of stock A when A receives signal δ1 and B receives signal δ2, than on purchasing new shares of stock B
for the opposing signal pattern.
Further, when δA,t+1 = δB,t+1, investment in stock A is a decreasing function of the probability γ that
information about the innovations to an asset’s value is revealed before the end of the period.
The structure imposed on the price impact of order ﬂow, ∆P(Pjt,I jt), is sufﬁcient to ensure that inde-
pendent of initial share prices, PAt and PBt, and initial holdings, SAt and SBt, the fund manager always
wants to distort investment toward assets in which he holds larger positions. That is, the fund manager wants
to hold an increasingly undiversiﬁed portfolio. If cash inﬂow is so high that the fund manager chooses to
hold some cash, then this result holds without the structure on ∆P(Pjt,I jt). If, instead, the fund manager
is fully invested in the market, then the result still holds as long as either PAt and PBt are sufﬁciently close,
or δ1 and δ2 are sufﬁciently close. Essentially, if we relax the structure on ∆P(Pjt,I jt), then we have to
worry about second-order effects related to the relative value of purchases, and these depend on differences
in ex ante share prices and differences in signals.
Proposition 1 offers several testable implications:
• If one interprets a smaller γ as capturing a smaller amount of time between the purchase of stocks and
the end of the period, then it follows that near the end of the period, the optimal investment is more
sensitive to assets in place and less sensitive to private information. The proposition suggests that
fund managers should invest more heavily on the basis of private information earlier in an evaluation
period (when γ is larger), and invest more heavily in existing holdings later in the evaluation period
(when γ is smaller). The extreme version of this latter investment distortion is the practice of high
closing.
• Re-interpreting γ as the probability that signals remain private information, it follows that, ceteris
paribus, in larger capitalization stocks where there are more outside sources of information, invest-
ments are less sensitive to share holdings.
9Thus, existing stock holdings cause a fund manager to distort investments. Despite this, we now show
thatifthefundmanagerisnotfullyinvestedinthemarket, themodelcannotgiverisetoshort-runpersistence
in fund performance:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the expected return on equity exceeds the risk-free rate. Then, if the fund
manager is not fully invested in the market, i.e., Mt > 0, both short-run and long-run fund returns are a
declining function of funds invested.
Because, on average, fund returns exceed the risk-free rate, it follows that if the fund manager is not fully
invested in stocks, then the model is inconsistent with the empirical regularity that returns exhibit short-run
persistence. Indeed, in Proposition 2 we assume that QPj,t−1 = Pjt, so that returns are calculated under
the assumption that the end of period t − 1 share price reﬂected the value of the ﬁrm at that moment, i.e.,
there was no past investment distortion. If f(rt−1) was higher due to greater past investment distortion, this
would lead to even more negatively-correlated short-run returns.
In practice, on average at any moment in time, cash holdings comprise but 6% of a fund’s holdings.
These minimal holdings partially reﬂect cash inﬂows from new investors that have not yet been invested,
and they reﬂect the fact that funds want to insure themselves against withdrawal demands from individual
investors. About 70% of all mutual fund trades are to meet investor liquidity demands (Edelen (1999)); and
due to the associated transactions costs, funds will seek to minimize them. Our model does not incorporate
such investor liquidity demands, and hence the insurance role for cash holdings. As a result, in the context
of our model, a 6% cash holding is best interpreted as being fully-invested.
We now show that short-run persistence in performance can arise if managers are fully invested in the
market. Speciﬁcally, we now show that if the fund manager is fully invested, then short-run returns ﬁrst rise
with f (rt−1).
Proposition 3 Suppose that δA,t+1 = δB,t+1 = δ, and a fund manager is fully invested in the market. Then
short-run returns ﬁrst rise with new funds under management, ∂rt/∂f > 0 for f(rt−1) sufﬁciently small,
but are a declining function of new funds for f(rt−1) sufﬁciently large.
Note that ∂rt/∂f > 0 when f is small even if the fund manager has no private information, so that
δ =0 . The intuition for Proposition 3 is cleanest when SAt ∼ SBt and PAt ∼ PBt so that IAt ∼ IBt ∼ 0.
Then Ijt shares are purchased at a premium of ∆P (Pjt,I jt), so the ‘cost’, ∆P(Pjt,I jt)Ijt is only of second
order. In contrast, the price impact of the share purchase on returns has a ﬁrst order positive impact of order
(1 − γ)∆P(Pjt,I jt)Sjt. The rest of the proof shows that the result extends when the fund manager makes
10non-trivial offsetting investments in the two stocks.7
Because short-run returns eventually fall for f(rt−1) sufﬁciently large, ‘Ponzi-schemes’ cannot be sup-
ported in the long run. In t +1 , δA,t+1 and δB,t+1 are revealed and incorporated into prices, so that, ceteris
paribus, greater investment distortions at date t reduce returns in t +1by more. Possibly offsetting this
decline is the fact that the date t investment distortion induced greater cash inﬂows, f(rt), which, in turn,
can facilitate another round of investment distortion. For returns in t +1not to fall, the second round of
investment distortion must dominate the impact due to the revelation of δA,t+1 and δB,t+1. For longer-run
returns to continue to rise, it must be that the higher short-run return from the immediate distortion of in-
vestment must more than offset lower returns due to realizing past distortions. But since short-run returns
eventually decline with f(rt−1) this cannot happen.
Combining this observation with Proposition 3, it immediately follows that
Proposition 4 Even if the fund manager has no private information, for f(rt−1) sufﬁciently small, short-
run returns are an increasing function of f(rt−1), but long-run returns are eventually a decreasing function
of f(rt−1). Hence, the model can reconcile both the short-run persistence in fund performance and the
long-run reversal in fund performance documented by Zheng (1999).
Because the fund manager has no private information, from a long-run perspective, the optimal stock invest-
ment is zero. Long-run returns are a strictly declining function of f(rt−1), because the price premium paid
for each share rises with the investment.
Note that these results hold even if past returns were so bad that redemptions lead to a net outﬂow of
money from the fund. Then the mutual fund manager must disinvest, and will do so to minimize the adverse
price impacts. It follows that the fund manager will tend to sell stocks in which he has smaller positions.
Further, in the environment characterized by Proposition 4, short-run returns will be lower (and negative)
for fund managers with greater redemptions, but there will be a long-run reversal in performance.
Since cash inﬂows are more sensitive to fund performance for newer funds (Rosten (1995), Chevalier
and Ellison (1997)), it follows that the persistence in short-run returns will decline as funds mature, and, in
turn, there will be a smaller long-run reversal in performance for mature funds, as Zheng (1999) documents.
Over time, funds with high short-run returns should under-perform the market in the long-run, as Zheng
(1999) also ﬁnds.
We now show that the return-cash ﬂow relationship characterized above emerges in the short- and long-
run of the most basic economy that one could construct.
7Note that as in Proposition 2 we calculate returns using QPj,t−1 = Pjt. Implicitly, this means that higher values of f(rt−1)
were not due to (greater) past investment distortion.
11Example: Consider an economy in which the fund manager has no private information, δA,t+1 = δB,t+1 =
0, and identical holdings, SAt = SBt = S>0, in two identical stocks that share an initial common price of
PAt = PBt =1 . Further, trades have a linear price impact, ∆P(1,I jt)=aIjt, a>0, so that the purchase
price for stock j ∈{ A,B} is ˆ Pjt =1+aIjt.
It is straightforward to verify that there is a critical value ¯ f such that the fund manager is fully invested
if and only if cash inﬂows, f, are less than ¯ f. Further for f<¯ f, the fund manager does best to divide
his purchases equally between stocks, purchasing I(f)=
√
1+2af−1
2a shares of each stock to generate an
expected mutual fund return of
E[r(f)] =
2(I(f)+S)(1 + i +( 1− γ)aI(f)) − (2S + f)
2S + f
. (6)
Initially, returns from investing are increasing in f,
∂
∂f




but the second derivative with respect to f is negative,
∂2
∂f2 [E[r(f = 0)]] =
a[−i − (1 − γ)S − 1]
2S
< 0.
Figure 2 illustrates the fund ﬂow-return relationship. The short-run portfolio return ﬁrst rises and then falls
with cash ﬂow into the fund. But note that the cash inﬂow that maximizes short-run returns, ¯ f, is quite
high, about 40% of the portfolio value. That is, although Proposition 3 only proves that short-run returns
are initially increasing in cash inﬂow, the ﬁgure reveals that short-run returns can continue to rise even if f
is reasonably large. In turn, this implies that there will be short-run persistence in portfolio performance, as
better immediate past performance will draw more cash inﬂow, which gives rise to higher current returns.
Note that the numerical ﬁnding illustrated in Figure 2 does not imply that higher returns will persist for
some time. This is because the fund has to realize the negative return consequences of its immediate past
investment distortions each period, as share prices incorporate the true value of past signals.
To derive how the fund ﬂow-return relationship is affected by the parameters of the economy, we next
see how returns vary with the exogenous parameters. We ﬁnd that
• Short-run returns fall with the information arrival rate, γ. That is, short-run returns are higher if







Thus, niche mutual funds that invest in stocks where there are fewer sources of information should
exhibit stronger short-run persistence and greater long-run reversal in performance.
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∂f f>I (f) and S ≥ 0. This result can reconcile the empirical regularity that niche stocks
have greater short-run persistence and larger long-run reversals in performance.
Different Price Schedules. We now explore how outcomes are affected if the price impact of trades differs
across stocks. We ﬁrst identify how fund managers’ investment incentives are affected by differences in
liquidity. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst suppose that ∆PAt(IAt)=aIAt and ∆PBt(IBt)=bIBt, where a<b ,b u t
that the stocks are otherwise identical, PAt = PBt =1 , SAt = SBt = S, and δAt = δBt = δ.
We then characterize how investments are affected when, in addition, SAt >S Bt. One reason why the
price impact of trade in stock A may be less than that in stock B is that SAt >S Bt is public information.
That is, market makers understand that because SAt >S Bt, a fund manager has an incentive to distort order
ﬂow toward stock A, so that comparable levels of order ﬂow in stocks A and B suggest a lower value for
δA,t+1 than for δB,t+1. Market makers incorporate the trading behavior of fund managers into their pricing,
setting a price schedule for stock A that is less sensitive to order ﬂow than that for stock B.
If the fund manager is fully invested, Mt =0 , then the ﬁrst order conditions imply:
(1 + i) + 2(1 − γ)aIAt + γδ +( 1− γ)aSAt
1+2 aIAt
=
(1 + i) + 2(1 − γ)bIBt + γδ +( 1− γ)bSBt
1+2 bIBt
(8)




1+4 b(f − IAt(1 + aIAt))


/2b, we can express IAt in terms of other
parameters,
(i + γ)+γδ +( 1− γ)aSAt
1+2 aIAt
=
(i + γ)+γδ +( 1− γ)bSBt 
1+4 b(f − IAt(1 + aIAt))
The complexity of this expression leads us to characterize numerically in Figure 3 how IAt depends on
a. The ﬁgure highlights that as long as cash inﬂow, f, is sufﬁciently small, investment in stock A rises
with a; but for higher values of f, investment falls with a. Further, SAt >S Bt magniﬁes these investment
consequences. The qualitative implications are:
• A fund manager’s investment in stock A rises with the price impact of stock A order ﬂow, a, as long
as f is sufﬁciently small so that “painting the tape” is relatively more important; but
13• A fund manager’s investment in stock A falls with the the price impact of stock A order ﬂow, a,i f
cash inﬂows, f are so high that the cost of purchasing new shares dominates.
That is, as long as cash inﬂows are not too high, the fund manager’s incentive to distort investments toward
illiquid assets rises. So, too, these results imply that if f is small, investment distortions are reduced if
market makers observe a fund’s holdings and consequently reduce the sensitivity of prices to order ﬂow
in stocks where the fund manager holds larger positions. However, if f is sufﬁciently large, such pricing
reinforces the direction of new investment by fund managers toward existing holdings of stock A.
2 Empirical Evidence
Our model predicts that mutual fund managers have especially large incentives to manipulate their portfolio
at the end of a measurement period (e.g., quarter). If this is so, then if mutual funds are “large” players
in the economy, the daily market return at the end of a measurement period may exceed daily returns on
other days. We now document this fact. Indeed, we ﬁnd that as the aggregate share of all equity held by
mutual funds has increased over the years, the end-of-quarter daily return/other daily return difference on the
aggregate market indexes has grown, strongly suggesting that fund manager portfolio manipulations have
had increasingly-large systematic impacts on aggregate market outcomes.
We use the CRSP Equally- and Value-Weighted Index Returns to calculate (i) the difference in returns
on the last trading day of the period (quarter or month) and the return on the ﬁrst trading day of the following
period, and (ii) the difference in returns on the last day of the period versus the average return on the other
trading days. We obtain mutual funds holdings of corporate equity (Reference FL653064000) and market
value of domestic corporations (Reference FL893064195) from the Federal Reserve US Flow of Funds
accounts for the ﬁrst quarter 1970 to third quarter 2001.
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the regression model
(rt − ˆ rt)=β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest






where rt is the return on the last trading day of quarter t and ˆ rt is the return on the ﬁrst trading day of
quarter t +1 . The results are presented for returns calculated using both the equally-weighted and value-
weighted index. Figure 4 plots the relationship between share of mutual fund holdings of equity and the
end-of-quarter abnormal return difference for the equally-weighted index. The ﬁgure clearly reveals an
extremely strong and signiﬁcant positive relationship between the mutual fund share of aggregate equity
and the return difference on the equally-weighted index. The ﬁgure also shows that the end-of-quarter
14return is far more likely than not to exceed the return on the ﬁrst day of the next quarter. Indeed, the
regression ﬁt as measured by the adjusted R2 =0 .20 for the equally-weighted index is remarkable. The
estimate of the coefﬁcient β1 is signiﬁcant and positive as predicted by our model. This result is robust to
the exclusion of the last 5 years of data when both abnormal returns and the share of mutual fund holdings
of equity were high. It is also worth noting that the share of mutual fund holdings of equity does not increase
monotonically over time (as one might expect) and has considerably more explanatory power than a simple
time trend variable. Contrasting the regressions for the equally-weighted and value-weighted indexes reveals
that the impact of the share of mutual fund holdings on this return difference is only statistically signiﬁcant
for the equally-weighted index. Because the equally-weighted index emphasizes smaller, less liquid, stocks
for which the short-term price impact of a trade is greater and more persistent, these are exactly the ﬁndings
predicted by our model.
Table2presentstheanalogousregressionsinwhichthedependentvariableisnowthedifferencebetween
the end-of-quarter return and the average return on the other days in the quarter. The same qualitative pattern
remains, but to a reduced degree, and the adjusted R2 falls to a still substantial 0.08. The weaker relationship
highlighted in Table 2 relative to Table 1 reveals that the market underperforms on the ﬁrst trading day of a
quarter, as it “bounces” back from the previous day’s manipulation.
Tables 3–5 investigate whether strategic mutual fund behavior explains abnormal end-of-month return
differences. Tables 3 and 4 suggest that while the coefﬁcient estimate for the share of equity held by mutual
funds is signiﬁcantly positive, the model has less explanatory power, as measured by the adjusted R2, when
estimated at monthly intervals. In fact, when the return difference for the last month in a quarter is excluded,
as in Table 5, the model has no explanatory power for equally-weighted index returns. Thus, we ﬁnd that the
crucial measurement period is a quarter, and that the incentive for fund managers to distort investment is so
strong at the end of a quarter for less liquid stocks that it signiﬁcantly affects returns on the equally-weighted
index. These ﬁndings reinforce those of Carhart et al. (2002) who provide additional evidence that mutual
funds primarily distort behavior only at the end of quarters.
3 Conclusion
It is well known that past fund performance inﬂuences subsequent net fund ﬂows and that fund manager
compensation rises with funds under management. These observations provide fund managers the incentive
to utilize short-term price impacts to “paint the tape”—in other words, to mark up their holdings at quarter
end through aggressive trading of stocks they already hold. To better understand the implications of this,
we model the fund manager’s investment decision and show that a fund manager the incentive to distort
15investment of new cash inﬂows towards stocks in which the fund has larger positions. We show how this
behavior leads to the empirically observed short-run persistence and long-run reversal in fund performance.
Our model also explains why mutual funds tend to be relatively undiversiﬁed and exhibit persistent stock
selection. It also supports the ﬁndings of Carhart et al. (2002) that trading-induced equity price inﬂation
near the end of the last day of a quarter contributes to abnormal fund returns on those days and that the end
of year performance effect is more pronounced for better historical performers (i.e., funds with more cash
on hand). Finally, we ﬁnd that the equally-weighted index return is signiﬁcantly higher on the last trading
day of a quarter, and lower on the ﬁrst trading day than on other trading days; and further that this return
difference has risen with the percentage of total equity that is held by mutual funds. This strong empirical
evidence indicates that the incentives of fund managers to distort investments are so high at the end of a
quarter that their behavior signiﬁcantly alters market outcomes.
16A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: From the ﬁrst-order conditions:
λbud =
(1 + i)PAt +( 1− γ)∆P(PAt,I At)+γδ1PAt +( 1− γ)IAt
∂∆P
∂IAt + SAt(1 − γ)∂∆P
∂IAt





(1 + i)PBt +( 1− γ)∆P(PBt,I Bt)+γδ2PBt +( 1− γ)IBt
∂∆P
∂IBt + SBt(1 − γ)∂∆P
∂IBt




Substituting for ∆P(Pj,I j)=k(PjIj)Pj,
(1 − γ)+
γ + i + γδ1 + PAtSAt(1 − γ)k
1+2 kPAtIAt
=( 1− γ)+
γ + i + γδ2 + PBtSBt(1 − γ)k
1+2 kPBtIBt
(12)
Then, reversing PAtSAt and PBtSBt, holding PAtIAt and PBtIBt ﬁxed, it is clear that:
γ + i + γδ1 + PBtSBt(1 − γ)k
1+2 kPAtIAt
<
γ + i + γδ2 + PAtSAt(1 − γ)k
1+2 kPBtIBt




Bt(δ2,δ 1). Then it follows that
(PAt +∆ P(PAt,I At(δ1,δ 2)))IAt(δ1,δ 2) > (PBt +∆ P(PBt,I Bt(δ2,δ 1)))IBt(δ2,δ 1)
We now show that investment in stock A is a decreasing function of γ. Let δ1 = δ2 = δ. Taking the












since 1+δ − PAtSAtk<1+δ − PBtSBtk and 1+2 kPAtIAt > 1+2 kPBtIBt. Then, we need to show



















But ∂ ˆ PBtIBt
∂( ˆ PAtIAt) = −1 and ∂PAtIAt
∂( ˆ PAtIAt) = ∂PBtIBt















γ + i + γδ + PAtSAt(1 − γ)k
( 1+2 kPAtIAt)2 +




17Proof of Proposition 2: If Mt > 0, then λbud =( 1 + i) and the marginal dollar is invested in cash
(dMt/df =1 ;∂I∗
jt/df =0 ,j= A,B). Differentiating short-run expected returns,
E[rt] = [(1 + i)Mt + E[QPAt](IAt + SAt)+E[QPBt](IBt + SBt)][PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f(rt−1)]
−1−1,

















[PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f]−1
−[(1 + i)Mt + E[QPAt](I∗
At + SAt)+E[QPBt](I∗
Bt + SBt)][PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f]−2
=( 1 + i)[PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f]−1
−[(1 + i)Mt + E[QPAt](I∗
At + SAt)+E[QPBt](I∗
Bt + SBt)][PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f]−2
=[ i − E[rt]][PAtSAt + PBtSBt + f]−1 ≤ 0, strict if E[rt] >i .
where the last equality follows from substitution. The expected mutual fund return (E[rt]) is always at least
as large as the risk-free rate (i) since the fund manager can always earn i by investing new fund inﬂows in
cash.
Proof of Proposition 3: From the budget constraint,


















We ﬁrst prove the result that short-run returns are increasing in f when IAt and IBt are small if f is close to








If the fund manager is fully invested, then expected returns are
E[rt]=

j={A,B} {(1 + i + γδ)Pjt(Ijt + Sjt)+( 1− γ)∆Pjt(Pjt,I jt)(Ijt + Sjt)}



































































∂Ik > 0 (by assumption) and
∂Ikt
∂f > 0 (since (12) can only hold if an increase in IAt coincides with
an increase in IBt).
More generally to show that the derivative of returns with respect to f is positive recognize that this










where num is the numerator of expected returns. Equivalently, dividing through by PAtSAt + PBtSBt,i t













where the equality follows from substitution of equations (10) and (11). That is, λbud reﬂects the marginal
return one more dollar, and if the marginal return exceeds 1+rt, then rt must be increasing in f. The
Lagrange multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal value of one more dollar of investment in stock A or
as the reduction in the marginal cost of selling one more dollar of investment in stock B. We now show that
for δ ≥ 0, this marginal cost grows monotonically as the fund manager sells more IB. Differentiating (11)
with respect to IBt we see that it has sign
(PBt +∆ P(PBt,I Bt)+IBt∆P (PBt,I Bt))
×[(1 − γ)(2∆P (PBt,I Bt)+IBt∆P  (PBt,I Bt)) + SBt(1 − γ)∆P  (PBt,I Bt)]
−(2∆P (PBt,I Bt)+IBt∆P  (PBt,I Bt))
×[(1 + i)PBt +( 1− γ)∆P(PBt,I Bt)+γδPBt +( 1− γ)(IBt + SBt)∆P (PBt,I Bt)]
< (PBt +∆ P(PBt,I Bt)+IBt∆P (PBt,I Bt))SBt(1 − γ)∆P  (PBt,I Bt)]
−(2∆P (PBt,I Bt)+IBt∆P  (PBt,I Bt))(γδPBt + SBt(1 − γ)∆P (PBt,I Bt))] < 0,
where the last inequality follows from δ ≥ 0 and A4. λbud takes its value evaluated at I∗
Bt, so that it exceeds
the derivative evaluated at IBt =0 , which we have proven exceeds rt.F o rδ<0 an analogous exercise on
(10) establishes monotonicity for IAt > 0.
That short-run returns must eventually decline with f, follows from A4, which implies that marginal
returns from making arbitrarily large purchases of a stock must eventually become negative. This implies
that once f grows sufﬁciently large, the fund manager begins to invest in cash at the point where the marginal
return on investing in stock is i, and where the short-run return on the portfolio exceeds i. It follows that for
f larger, short-run returns decline.
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21Table 1: Regression results: dependent variable is the difference between the return on the last trading day
of the quarter t, denoted rt, and the return on the ﬁrst trading day of the next quarter, denoted ˆ rt. Return
differences are expressed in percent. t-values are reported in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates.
Number of observations: 127. The estimated regression model is:
(rt − ˆ rt)=β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest


+ εt εt ∼ iid

0,σ2
Share of equity held
Constant by mutual funds (in %)
Returns Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value adj. R2
Equally-weighted (inc. dividend) −0.0952 0.412 0.0679 0.000 0.203
(−0.823) (5.75)
Equally-weighted (exc. dividend) −0.0932 0.422 0.0680 0.000 0.203
(−0.806) (5.75)
Value-weighted (inc. dividend) −0.0204 0.897 0.0182 0.258 0.002
(−0.130) (1.13)
Value-weighted (exc. dividend) −0.0159 0.919 0.0180 0.261 0.002
(−0.101) (1.13)
22Table 2: Regression results: dependent variable is the difference between the return on the last trading day
of the quarter t, denoted rt, and the average daily return calculated over the remainder of the trading days
in the quarter, denoted ¯ rt. Return differences are expressed in percent. t-values are reported in parentheses
below the coefﬁcient estimates. Number of observations: 127. The estimated regression model is:
(rt − ¯ rt)=β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest


+ εt εt ∼ iid

0,σ2
Share of equity held
Constant by mutual funds (in %)
Returns Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value adj. R2
Equally-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.172 0.114 0.0384 0.001 0.081
(1.59) (3.48)
Equally-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.176 0.106 0.0383 0.001 0.080
(1.62) (3.46)
Value-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.0542 0.641 0.00238 0.841 −0.008
(0.560) (0.201)
Value-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.0651 0.576 0.00192 0.872 −0.008
(0.467) (0.162)
23Table 3: Regression results: dependent variable is the difference between the return on the last trading day of
month (rti) and the average daily return calculated over the remainder of the trading days in the month (¯ rti),
where i =1indicates the ﬁrst month in quarter t, i =2indicates the second month in quarter t, and i =3
indicates the last month in quarter t. Monthly return differences are averaged over each quarter t and are
expressed in percent per day. t-values are reported in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates. Number






(rti − ¯ rti)

= β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest


+ εt εt ∼ iid

0,σ2
Share of equity held
Constant by mutual funds (in %)
Returns Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value adj. R2
Equally-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.160 0.018 0.0198 0.004 0.056
(2.41) (2.91)
Equally-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.162 0.016 0.0198 0.004 0.056
(2.43) (2.91)
Value-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.159 0.057 −0.00243 0.774 −0.007
(1.92) (−0.288)
Value-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.157 0.058 −0.00222 0.792 −0.007
(1.91) (−0.264)
24Table 4: Regression results: dependent variable is the difference between the return on the last trading day
of the month (rti) and the return on the ﬁrst trading day of the next month (ˆ rti), where i =1indicates the
ﬁrst month in quarter t, i =2indicates the second month in quarter t, and i =3indicates the last month
in quarter t. Monthly return differences are averaged over each quarter t and are expressed in percent per
day. t-values are reported in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates. Number of observations: 127. The






(rti − ˆ rti)

= β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest


+ εt εt ∼ iid

0,σ2
Share of equity held
Constant by mutual funds (in %)
Returns Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value adj. R2
Equally-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.100 0.152 0.0175 0.015 0.039
(1.44) (2.47)
Equally-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.103 0.139 0.0174 0.015 0.039
(1.49) (2.46)
Value-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.183 0.081 −0.0165 0.121 0.011
(1.76) (−1.56)
Value-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.191 0.066 −0.0170 0.111 0.012
(1.85) (−1.61)
25Table 5: Regression results: dependent variable is the difference between the return on the last trading day
of the month (rti) and the return on the ﬁrst trading day of the month (ˆ rti), for months that do not occur at
the end of a quarter (i =1 ,2), where i =1indicates the ﬁrst month in quarter t, i =2indicates the second
month in quarter t, and i =3indicates the last month in quarter t. Monthly return differences are averaged
over each quarter t and are expressed in percent per day. t-values are reported in parentheses below the






(rti − ˆ rti)

= β0 + β1
	
Mutual fund holdings of corporate equityt
Market value of domestic companiest


+ εt εt ∼ iid

0,σ2
Share of equity held
Constant by mutual funds (in %)
Returns Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value adj. R2
Equally-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.197 0.045 −0.00776 0.438 −0.003
(2.02) (−0.778)
Equally-weighted (exc. dividend) 0.202 0.041 −0.00790 0.430 −0.003
(2.06) (−0.793)
Value-weighted (inc. dividend) 0.284 0.042 −0.0339 0.018 0.037
(2.06) (−2.41)







































Figure 1: Performance of positive and negative portfolios for different holding periods. The ﬁgure plots the
monthly average α3 for portfolios with positive inﬂows (POS) and portfolios with negative inﬂows (NEG)
for different holding periods up to 36 months. POS invests in all available funds with positive new money
and weights by funds’ new money. NEG invests in all available funds with negative new money and weights
by funds’ new money. α3 is calculated from the time series regression of the excess portfolio returns on
the excess market return and the mimicking returns for the size (SMB) and book-to-market equity factors.
The average monthly portfolio α3 are calculated for different holding periods of 1 to 36 months after the
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Figure 2: Fund ﬂow-return relationship in base example. Parameters: SAt = SBt =1 , a = b =0 .1, γ =
0.5, i =0 .05, PAt = PBt =1 , δA,t+1 = δB,t+1 =0 .F o rft ≤ 0.9504, IAt = IBt = ((1+2aft)0.5−1)/2a
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Figure 3: Fund manager’s investment decision and differences in price sensitivity. Parameters: i =0 .05,
γ =0 .5, PAt = PBt =1 , δA,t+1 = δB,t+1 =0 .05, b =0 .1. Balanced corresponds to SAt = SBt =1 .
Unbalanced corresponds to SAt =2and SBt =1 . For both the balanced and unbalanced cases, we plot the
fund manager’s investment in stock A, IAt, versus the price impact of stock A to order ﬂow (a) for low cash
inﬂows (f =0 .2) and for high cash inﬂows (f =1 .8).
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Figure 4: Plot of (Return on last trading day of quarter − return on ﬁrst trading day of next quarter) versus
(Mutual fund holdings of corporate equity / Market value of domestic companies). Returns are based on
the CRSP Equally-Weighted Index (excluding dividends).
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